By The Economist online….
FEW banks can match the quaint serenity of Banco Delta Asia’s headquarters in Macau. Housed in a pastel-yellow colonial building opposite a 16th-century church, its entrance is flanked by tall vases, depicting sampan gliding between karst hills. In the tiled square outside, men laze under a banyan tree and an elderly woman peels a boiled egg for lunch.
But in 2005 this backwater bank incurred the wrath and might of the world’s financial hegemon. America’s Treasury accused it of laundering money for North Korea, prompting depositors to panic, other banks to keep their distance and the Macau government to step in. The Treasury subsequently barred American financial institutions from holding a correspondent account for the bank, excluding it from the American financial system.
Macau is over 8,000 miles from Washington, DC. But it is hard to escape the long arm of the dollar. Its dominance reflects what economists call network externalities: the more people use it, the more useful it becomes to everyone else. One person’s willingness to accept dollars from another depends on a third person’s readiness to accept dollars from them.
The dollar also benefits from a hub-and-spoke model for the exchange of currencies, the invoicing of trade and the settlement of international payments, as the late Ronald McKinnon of Stanford University argued. If every one of the more than 150 currencies was traded directly against every other, the world would need over 11,175 foreign-exchange markets. If instead each trades against the dollar, it needs only 149 or so. If you cannot buy the afghani with the zloty, you can still sell one for dollars with which to buy the other.
Likewise, if every international bank keeps an account in New York, any bank can transfer funds to any other through the same financial hub. “The global financial system is like a sewer and all of the pipes run through New York,” says Jarrett Blanc of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
This gives America’s Treasury great punitive power and jurisdictional reach. Many companies that do not buy or sell wares in America nonetheless make or collect payment through New York. Because these transfers pass through American financial institutions, the Treasury can claim jurisdiction on the ground that its banks are exporting financial services to the bad guy. It can also hit companies where it hurts. For many, exclusion from America’s financial system is a more potent threat than exclusion from America’s customers. Last month, for example, the Treasury threatened to seize dollars paid to Rusal, a Russian metals firm that is one of the world’s biggest aluminium producers, crippling it and upending the global aluminium market, until the turmoil forced a rethink.
Read more here: The long arm of the dollar
Category: Business and finance, Approved, Finance and economics, FINANCE